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CASE NOTE
Juvenile Law-MINNESOTA ARTICULATES STANDARDS FOR
DELINQUENCY DISPOSITION-In re Welfare of L.K W., 372
N.W.2d 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
OnJanuary 31, 1984, a 16 year old girl was arrested for shoplifting
at a local mall.' It was her first and only offense.2 In adult court, this
person probably would have been ordered to make restitution and
pay a fine.3 But because she came under the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court, she was subjected to the "unbridled discretion" of the
county judge.4 She was eventually sentenced to ninety days at a pri-
1. The juvenile, identified by the court as L.K.W., was with two other persons
when she was arrested at the KandiMall in Willmar, Minnesota (Kandiyohi County).
She had in her possession various articles of clothing from several different stores.
She was charged with violating Minnesota Statutes section 609.52, subdivisions 2(1)
and 3(5), the misdemeanor shoplifting statute. See Brief for Appellant at A-2 to A-4,
In re Welfare of L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
2. L.K.W. had never been arrested before, nor was she in trouble at school.
The source of L.K.W.'s problems may have been the pressure she was under at
home. She and her brother were living with their father on his farm near Litchfield.
Two other siblings lived with their mother at her home in Grove City. Her mother,
unhappy with the situation, successfully appealed to the juvenile court to have her
visitation time with L.K.W increased. L.K.W., however, preferred to stay with her
father. See L.K W, 372 N.W.2d at 394-95; Brief for Appellant at 5.
3. The maximum penalty for adults who violate Minnesota Statutes section
609.52, subdivisions 2(1) and 3(5) is imprisonment for not more than 90 days and/or
payment of a fine of not more than $700. The contrast between the probable out-
come in adult court and the result in L.K. W was commented upon by the court of
appeals:
The events here sharply contrast with practice and procedure L.K.W.
would have encountered in adult court. With restitution already completed,
an adult in a comparable case could anticipate a moderate fine. If other
penalties were imposed, they would likely be suspended on the sole con-
diton that no other offenses occur. Some courts would suspend all or part
of the fine. Some courts or prosecutors would withhold the record of con-
viction for a first offense of the kind. Ironically, adult process includes a
right to trial by jury that is extended to the case because of the possibility of
incarceraton. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.01, subd. l(l)(a).
LK W., 372 N.W.2d at 402-03.
4. The dispositional order from which L.K.W. appealed was signed by the Hon-
orable Cedric F. Williams, Judge of Meeker County Court. The phrase "unbridled
discretion" has been used time and again to describe juvenile court procedure. Its
source may be the often-quoted paragraph from the landmark United States
Supreme Court decision on juvenile justice, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967):
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to
a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable con-
text. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is-to
say the least-debatable. And in practice . . . the results have not been en-
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vate residential facility located 150 miles from her home.5 The result
was so egregious that, upon appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
seized the opportunity to "lay down the law" for the juvenile courts.
6
The Honorable Gary L. Crippen, writing for a unanimous panel, de-
livered a stern rebuke on the standards to be followed in formulating
a delinquency disposition. This casenote will examine in detail the
lessons of In re Welfare of L.K. W.,7 which are of interest to anyone
concerned with juvenile justice.
The juvenile court system was created with the presumption that
future criminal conduct could be prevented through reform and re-
habilitation of youthful offenders.8 The parens patriae doctrine
emerged in the nineteenth century, reflecting an interest in predict-
ing what sorts of juvenile behavior would result in future criminal-
ity.9 Children thought to be predelinquent were subjected to
tirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbri-
dled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure.
387 U.S. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
5. Juvenile courts use the words "to place" and "placement" to describe re-
moval of the juvenile from his or her home and putting him or her in foster homes,
institutions, or private facilities. L.K.W.'s "placement" was for 90 to 100 days, at a
cost of $6,500.00. Her parents were ordered to pay what they could and the county
was responsible for the rest. L.K.W. stayed at the St. Croix Camp for Girls for 66
days, until the Minnesota Court of Appeals stayed the placement order and returned
custody to her parents. See L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d at 394.
6. L.K. W is the first published decision by a Minnesota appellate court on the
topic of delinquency dispositions since the establishment of Minnesota's juvenile
court system 80 years ago. See L.K. W, 372 N.W.2d at 397; see also Act of April 17,
1909, ch. 232, 1909 Minn. Laws 269; Act of April 19, 1905, ch. 285, 1905 Minn. Laws
418 (developing Minnesota's first delinquency laws). In an interview on September
15, 1986, Judge Crippen listed several possible explanations for the lack of published
opinions on this subject: 1) there were limited appellate remedies prior to the formu-
lation of the court of appeals; 2) juveniles commonly waive their right to counsel;
3) there has been substantial disinterest in the field of juvenile law on the part of
attorneys and judges; and 4) there is a cultural disinterest in children who are difficult
or different. Interview with the Honorable Gary L. Crippen, Judge, Minnesota Court
of Appeals (September 15, 1986) [hereinafter Crippen Interview].
7. 372 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
8. A historical perspective of the juvenile justice system is beyond the scope of
this casenote. For an in-depth analysis of the principles upon which the American
juvenile court system was founded, see F. FAUST & P. BANTINGHAM, JUVENILE JUSTICE
PHILOSOPHY (1974); E. RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT
EXPERIMENT (1978); Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile
Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 142-69 (1984).
9. The parens patriae doctrine expanded the role of the government as guardian
of neglected and delinquent children alike:
The role of this doctrine in American juvenile justice has been misunder-
stood due to a failure to recognize that the distinction between neglected
children and delinquent children, which is of great importance in the twenti-
eth century, had virtually no meaning in the nineteenth-century predelin-
quency system .... In 1898 Illinois reformers reaffirmed the unitary nature
[Vol. 13
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commitment by the courts.' 0
The 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act was the seminal legislation
which established a juvenile court."I The new court retained its
power to remove children from their homes and place them in insti-
tutions or foster homes.12 The treatment of choice for crime-prone
children became removal of the child from its own home and place-
ment into a "better" family.13
of predelinquency by reporting: "If the child is the material out of which
men and women are made, the neglected child is the material out of which
paupers and criminals are made." Thus, when the nineteenth-century re-
formers spoke of parens patriae, they were dealing with neglected and crimi-
nal children; they were articulating the duty of the government to intervene
in the lives of all children who might become a community crime problem.
S. Fox, MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS 85-86 (2d ed. 1981) (em-
phasis in original).
10. The notion of what type of behavior justified fear of future criminality had
not changed much by the end of the century. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act in-
cluded any child who:
[i]s destitute or homeless or abandoned; or dependent upon the public for
support, or has not proper parental care or guardianship; or who habitually
begs or receives alms; or who is found living in any house of ill fame or with
any vicious or disreputable person; or whose home, by reason of neglect,
cruelty or depravity on the part of his parents, guardian or other person in
whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such a child; and any child under
the age of 8 years who is found peddling or selling any article or singing or
playing any musical instrument upon the streets or giving any public
entertainment.
S. Fox, supra note 9, at 85 n.31 (citing Act of April 21, 1899, ch. 1, 1899 Ill. Laws 129,
131-32).
11. Creation of the juvenile court was an extension of the "Rehabilitative Ideal,"
the belief that the offender could and should be reformed instead of punished. One
commentator stated that:
The juvenile court was based on this Rehabilitative Ideal. It was con-
ceived as a specialized, bureaucratic agency, staffed by experts and designed
to serve the needs of a specific category of client: the "child at risk," whether
offender, dependent, or neglected. Thejuvenile court professionals were to
make discretionary, individualized treatment decisions to achieve benevo-
lent goals and social uplift by substituting a scientific and preventative ap-
proach for the traditional punitive philosophy of the criminal law. The legal
justification for intervention was parens patriae-the right and responsibility
of the state to substitute its own control over children for that of the natural
parents when the latter were unable or unwilling to meet their responsibili-
ties or when the child posed a community crime problem.
Feld, supra note 8, at 148.
12. Government intervention and coercive placement of noncriminal children
had been legally sanctioned for years prior to establishment of the juvenile court.
One commentator stated:
[I]n almost every state the legal and ideological innovations typically associ-
ated with the juvenile court (e.g., the extension of legal control over non-
criminal children, the denial of due process, and the legalization of the
rehabilitative ideal) had occurred before the advent of children's courts, as a
result of earlier legislation establishing juvenile reformatories.
Sutton, Social Structure, Institutions, and the Legal Status of Children in the United States, 88
AM.J. Soc. 915, 917 (1983).
13. The statutory goal of the 1899 Act was set forth as:
1987]
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While the intentions of the system's creators may have been noble,
it introduced a form of government intervention into family life that
often resulted in disregard of children's rights. The United States
Supreme Court began addressing the constitutional rights of
juveniles years after the juvenile court's inception.14 Through the
Court's examination, it became apparent that the system contained
few constitutional safeguards. By 1967, the Court found that the
"unbridled discretion" of the juvenile court was inconsistent with its
goals of rehabilitation and protection.t5
Minnesota's juvenile court laws have retained the rehabilitative
ideal throughout recent reforms.' 6 In December 1982, the Minne-
This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purpose may be
carried out, to-wit: That the care, custody and discipline of a child shall
approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents,
and in all cases where it can properly be done the child be placed in an
improved family home and become a member of the family by legal adop-
tion or otherwise.
Act of April 21, 1899, ch. 1, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
14. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (juveniles protected against
double jeopardy); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (constitution does
not guarantee juveniles the right to a jury trial); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(charges against a juvenile that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juveniles
granted constitutional rights to notice of pending charges, right to confrontation and
cross-examination, right to counsel, and right against self-incrimination); Kent v.
U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (due process must be extended to juveniles in court
proceedings).
15. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18. The Gault decision was in response to the placement of
a minor in a juvenile detention home for the offense of making lewd telephone calls.
His parents were given no notice of his being taken into custody or of charges against
him. Id. at 4-5.
The Court in Gault explained that the civil nature of the court enabled the state
to preclude applying the procedural safeguards to juveniles that it normally applied
to people under the label of criminal proceedings. Id. at 16. Moreover, under the
doctrine ofparens patriae, the state had the right to deny minors the procedural rights
given adults, theorizing that minors have the right to custody, but not to liberty. Id.
The Court urged that rehabilitation and discipline take place in the juvenile's
own home, if at all possible. Id. at 28.
16. MINNESOTA STATUTES §§ 260.011-54 (1984) is cited as the Juvenile Court
Act. The intent and purpose of the legislation is set out at MINNESOTA STATUTES
§ 260.011, subdivision 2:
The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile courts is to secure for each
child alleged or adjudicated neglected or dependent and under the jurisdiction of
the court, the care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve
the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child and the
best interests of the state; to provide judicial procedures which protect the
welfare of the child; to preserve and strengthen the child's family ties when-
ever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when his
welfare or safety cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and,
when the child is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody,
care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should
have been given by his parents.
The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to be
[Vol. 13
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sota Supreme Court adopted new rules of procedure for the juvenile
courts. 17 The purpose of the new rules specifically includes protec-
tion of the child's constitutional rights, promotion of his or her reha-
bilitation, and protection of the public.' 8
The juvenile court deals with five basic types of cases: (1) delin-
quency (cases where a juvenile has violated a federal, state, or local
law);I 9 (2) status offenses (petty offenses such as running away, tru-
ancy, alcohol possession and/or abuse; if an adult were to engage in
these activities, they would not be considered offenses);20 (3) depen-
dency (cases where the child is without a parent or guardian, or the
parent is unable to take care of the child);21 (4) neglect (cases where
the child has been abandoned by parents, or the parent refuses or
neglects to care for the child);22 (5) termination of parental rights
(cases where parents consent to terminate their rights to their chil-
dren, or where the parent is determined to be unfit because of con-
delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by
maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior
and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior. This pur-
pose should be pursued through means that are fair and just, that recognize
the unique characteristics and needs of children, and that give children ac-
cess to opportunities for personal and social growth.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. The Rules were adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court on December 17,
1982, and became effective on May 1, 1983.
18. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 1.02 states:
The purpose of Rules 1-35 and 65 is to establish uniform practice and
procedure for the juvenile courts of the State of Minnesota, to assure that
the constitutional rights of the child are protected and to promote the reha-
bilitation of the child and the protection of the public. These rules shall be
construed to achieve these purposes.
Id.
19. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CENTER, STATE PLANNING
AGENCY, DIRECTIONS: How TODAY'S JUVENILE JUSTICE TRENDS HAVE AFFECTED POL-
ICY, at 7-8 (Oct. 1984)[hereinafter DIRECTIONS]. The CJSAC report found that, "De-
linquency cases are the most frequent in juvenile court," and cited the following
percentages for Minnesota petitions to juvenile court in 1983: delinquency, 61%;
status offenses, 25%; and dependency, neglect and termination of parental rights,
14%. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 9. The most common status offenses in Minnesota in 1983 were alco-
hol offenses (54%), truancy (18%), and runaways (14%). Id. at 10.
21. Id. at 9. The CJSAC report states that in Minnesota, "In 1983 more than
54% of all dependency cases (at disposition) involved kids ages twelve and older. The
majority of dependency cases are teenagers, not little kids. " (emphasis in original). Id.
22. Id. at 9. "Neglect cases include children 'who are without proper parental
care because of faults or habits of parents; ... or where the child's behavior, associa-
tions, occupation, environment, etc., is injurious to the self or others.' " Id. The
statutory definition of "neglected child" is found at MINNESOTA STATUTES § 260.015,
subdivision 10; the definition of "dependent child" is at MINNESOTA STATUrES
§ 260.015, subd. 6; the definition of "delinquent child" is at MINNESOTA STATUTES
§ 260.015, subd. 5.
1987]
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duct detrimental to the child's physical or mental health).23
Juvenile court proceedings are not, technically, criminal in na-
ture.24 However, where the fault of the child is at issue and penalties
may attach, criminal protections apply. 25 For example, the only ad-
missible evidence in a juvenile court hearing is that which would be
admissible in a criminal trial26 and the standard of proof at trial is
beyond a reasonable doubt.27
Despite these similarities, juvenile court is quite different from
criminal court in several respects. Children cannot be said to have
been convicted of a crime because of an adjudication from the juve-
nile court.2 8 Further, the juvenile court has its own vocabulary.29
Finally, the procedure for processing juveniles through the juvenile
court is different.30
23. Id. at 9. Parental rights also may be terminated in cases "where it has been
determined by the court that the parents have abandoned their child; or have sub-
stantially, continuously or repeatedly refused or neglected to meet the child's needs
... [o]r where the parent was ordered to support the child but failed without good
cause." Id. The specific statutory grounds for termination of parental rights are set
forth at Minnesota Statutes section 260.221.
24. There are like sources of initiation of criminal complaints and juvenile peti-
tions. Any person can execute a criminal complaint under Minnesota Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 201. Any person can file a juvenile petition under Minnesota Statutes
section 260.131. Police officers can use an adult citation under Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure 6.01, and there is also a citation-like practice in juvenile court for
police officers and school attendance officers under Minnesota Statutes section
260.132.
25. The court in In re Welfare of L.Z., 380 N.W.2d 898, 904 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) stated that:
Prior appellate decisions, consistent with Minnesota's procedural rules, re-
flect that where the fault of the child is at issue and penalties may attach,
criminal protections apply. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1.... (1967) (juveniles
have a right to notice of charges, counsel, confrontation and cross-examina-
tion); Raino v. State, 255 N.W.2d 398, 399-400 (Minn. 1977) (notice of
charges); In re Welfare of T.D.F., 258 N.W.2d 774, 775 (1977) (right to effec-
tive counsel).
Id.
26. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 27.04 provides, "The court shall admit only such evi-
dence as would be admissible in a criminal trial." Id.
27. MINN. R.P.Juv. CT. 27.05 provides, "To be proved at trial, allegations in the
delinquency or petty petition must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
28. In re Hitzemann, 281 Minn. 275, 179, 161 N.W.2d 542, 545 (1968); MINN.
STAT. § 260.211.
29. See DIRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 7. For example, a juvenile court judge will
order or choose a disposition rather than sentence the child; a child is adjudicated
delinquent, not found guilty of a crime; there are no trials in juvenile court, only
hearings; a case is begun by a petition of delinquency instead of a criminal complaint.
Id.
30. Id. at 7. The first procedural step in juvenile court is called intake. At this
stage, a decision is made whether formal proceedings should be initiated. In Minne-
sota, "The discretionary decision as to whether a delinquency or petty matter should
be initiated lies with the county attorney." MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 17. If the case is to
[Vol. 13
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The heart of the juvenile justice system is the disposition - the
punishment the juvenile receives for the offense.31 There are a
broad range of options from which the juvenile court may choose
when making its dispositional order. Options include confinement
in a correctional institution, payment of a fine, probation, and medi-
cal treatment. The most common dispositions given in Minnesota
are probation and restitution.3 2 Unlike the sentencing guidelines in
criminal court, however, there is not necessarily a connection be-
tween the specific crime or status offense committed by a juvenile
and the punishment he or she receives.33
The case of In re Welfare of L.K. W34 provides an excellent example
of how "unbridled discretion" can result in a disposition which is
disproportionate to the offense. L.K.W. received four different dis-
position orders over a sixteen month period.35 She appealed from
proceed into juvenile court, a petition must be filed. See MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 19.01-
.06. Juveniles are arraigned, and a hearing (trial) is held to determine if allegations
of the petition are proved. See MINN. R.P.Juv. CT. 20 (Arraignment) and 27 (Trials).
If the allegations are proved, the court must adjudicate the child as delinquent. See
MINN. R.P.Juv. CT. 29. After the child has been adjudicated, the court holds a dispo-
sition hearing, at which time the court makes its final order in the matter. See MINN.
R.P. Juv. CT. 30.
31. Dispositions for children adjudicated as delinquent are set forth at Minnesota
Statutes section 260.185. Beyond the list of possible punishments, the statute adds
these two requirements:
Any order for a disposition authorized under this section shall contain
written findings of fact to support the disposition ordered, and shall also set
forth in writing the following information:
(a) Why the best interests of the child are served by the disposition ordered; and
(b) What alternative dispositions were considered by the court and why
such dispositions were not appropriate in the instant case.
Id. (emphasis added).
32. See DIRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 13. A juvenile may receive several disposi-
tions simultaneously, for example, court ordered chemical dependency treatment
along with probation.
33. Id. at 13. The CJSAC report states:
The most likely reason a juvenile will be placed in a local correctional facility or a
correctional group home is neither for a property crime nor for a violent crime; it is for
the offense of "obstructing court, " which includes violations of court orders or
terms of probation for a previous offense, or failure to appear in court....
From 1982 to 1983, the numbers ofjuvenile cases for "obstructing court " increased by
4 Or, causing an increase in correctional placements for these cases by 130juveniles -
a 4776 increase. This change occurred in spite of the fact that the total
number of status and delinquency petitions hardly changed from 1982 to
1983.
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
34. 372 N.W.2d 392.
35. The dispositions were entered on July 18, 1984, August 29, 1984, October
26, 1984, and April 19, 1985. Sixteen months passed from the time L.K.W. was ar-
rested until she received the final disposition from the court in April 1985. See MINN.
STAT. § 260.181, subd. 4 (the juvenile court may continue jurisdiction until the indi-
vidual becomes 19 years of age).
1987]
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the fourth and final order.3 6
L.K.W. was arrested in January 1984 for shoplifting.37 The first
disposition hearing in the matter was on May 30, 1984.38 At that
time, L.K.W. formally admitted committing the misdemeanor of-
fense, and had already made restitution.39 The probation officer in
charge of her case reported that L.K.W. was living with her father
and managing his household.40 She was an average student in her
sophomore year in high school, and held a part-time job as a wait-
ress. 4 ' She had no prior law violations and no behavioral problems
at school.42 The probation officer characterized L.K.W.'s relation-
ship with her mother as "chaotic."43 The mother, when interviewed
by the probation officer, said she had suspicions about L.K.W.'s con-
duct but could not provide any specific information when confronted
with the generality of her accusations. 4 4 The probation officer's re-
port also had attached to it a summary of her interviews with three
therapists who had counseled with the family:45 "All three therapists
believed there was no reason why the child and her brother could
not safely live with their father."46 The probation officer recom-
mended to the court that it order continued counseling for L.K.W.
and her parents. 4 7 The case was continued for one or two ninety day
periods, and L.K.W. was placed under temporary probationary
36. The order is dated April 16, 1985 but it was actually signed and entered
shortly after the hearing on April 19, 1985. See L.K. W, 372 N.W.2d at 396.
37. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
38. L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d at 394, n.1.





44. Id. The court provided the following details on the initial probation officer's
assessment of the situation between the mother and daughter:
The initial probation officer's report also showed that the child had a "cha-
otic" relationship with her mother. The report said the mother indicated
that she had "limit setting" problems with the child, that she had suspicions
about the child's personal conduct, and that the child had been "getting
away with murder" since staying with her father; the report added that the
mother was confronted about the general accusations but couldn't give any
specific information. The officer noted that the mother seemed to her to be
"somewhat" of a "perfectionist," and that there was no trust in the relation-
ship of the mother and daughter.
Id.
45. Id. The probation officer's report "indicated serious discord of the parents, a
history of family violence, some unspecified battering by the father, and active in-
volvement of both parents and the child in counseling programs." Id.
46. Id. L.K.W.'s own therapist felt she had " 'genuine distress' when away from
her father, and that the mother showed little sensitivity to the child's needs." Id.
47. The juvenile court has statutory jurisdiction over the child's parents by virtue
of Minnesota Statutes section 260.185, subdivision 1(b). In another recent decision
from the Minnesota Court of Appeals, this particular power was discussed:
[Vol. 13
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The trial court entered its first dispositional order in the case in
July 1984.49 The order contained a finding of delinquency and
transferred custody of L.K.W. to the Minnesota Commissioner of
Corrections for placement at a state correctional facility.50 The
transfer was stayed, however, and the court instead ordered that
L.K.W.: (1) stay with her mother for seven days every two weeks;
(2) be put under probationary supervision, which included rules on
curfew, counseling, and obeying both parents; and (3) be placed in a
foster home if the arrangement were to "fail."51
Forty days later, in August 1984, the court issued its second dispo-
sition order.52 The ex parte order53 placed L.K.W. in foster care. It
was reported at a later hearing that the initial probation officer put
L.K.W. in a foster home on the day before the second order was
issued.54 The initial probation officer said there was a total break-
The authority to deal with parents may imply, both in delinquency mat-
ters and truancy matters, that fault or need rests in part with parents and not
with children, and exercise of the power in some cases could diminish
chances for the child's loss of freedoms. However, the dispositional powers
of the court are concurrent, not mutually exclusive, so that powers to deal
with parents constitutes court authority in addition to powers directly affect-
ing the child.
L.Z., 380 N.W.2d at 901-02, n.1. Oral arguments were heard by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in this case on September 17, 1986.
48. L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d at 394, n.1. MINN. STAT. § 260.185, subd. 3 provides:
When it is in the best interests of the child to do so and when child has
admitted the allegations contained in the petition before the judge or refe-
ree, or when a hearing has been held as provided for in section 260.155 and
the allegations contained in the petition have been duly proven but, in
either case, before a finding of delinquency has been entered, the court may
continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 days on any one order. Such
a continuance may be extended for one additional successive period not to
exceed 90 days and only after the court has reviewed the case and entered
its order for an additional continuance without a finding of delinquency.
Id.
49. L.K.W, 372 N.W.2d at 394-95. The Delinquency Adjudication Order dated
July 18, 1984 may be found at Brief for Respondent at R.A. 6-8.
50. L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d at 394-95.
51. Id. at 395. The order reads in part, "If said placement fails, a second alterna-
tive would be that the care, custody and control of said child be transferred to the
Meeker County Social Service Department for placement in a suitable foster home."
See Brief for Respondent at R.A. 7.
52. L.K. W., 372 N.W.2d at 395. The August 29, 1984 Order Vacating Prior Or-
der is set out at Brief for Respondent at R.A. 9-11.
53. L.K. IV., 372 N.W.2d at 395; see id. at 395 n.2. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 30.06 gov-
erns informal reviews of all disposition orders, and provides for ex parte modification
of the disposition. See id., subd. 2. Two weeks after the order was issued, L.K.W.'s
attorney requested a formal hearing to review the ex parte order under Minnesota
Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Courts 30.07, subdivision 2. L.K. W., 372 N.W.2d at
395; see id. at 395 n.3.
54. L.KW., 372 N.W.2d at 395.
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down in the mother-daughter relationship, and there were unspeci-
fied problems with the twenty-two child behavior conditions imposed
by the July probation agreement. 55 It was also later discovered that
the mother had asked the probation officer to put L.K.W. in the fos-
ter home.56
A formal hearing to review the ex parte disposition was conducted
in October 1984.57 The circumstances surrounding the issuance of
the second order were established.58 A current report from one of
the psychologists who had examined L.K.W. in June stated that "the
child was harmed by foster care and by being ordered to stay part-
time with her mother."59 The psychologist also felt the child's ad-
justment deteriorated with either arrangement. 60 The probation of-
ficer recommended that L.K.W. be kept in foster care. 61 L.K.W.
55. Id. One of the conditions of the agreement was that L.K.W. spend 50% of
her time with each parent. Id.
56. Id. At a review hearing in October 1984, L.K.W. "testified that her mother
asked the probation officer to put her in a foster home, and that she didn't think her
mother wanted her to come back. She said she had a positive relationship with her
father. This testimony was uncontradicted." Id.
57. Id. The hearing was held on October 16, 1984. See Brief for Respondent at
R.A. 12-19.
58. See L.K.W, 372 N.W.2d at 395.
59. Id. at 396.
60. Id.
61. The probation officer sent a memorandum to the Honorable Cedric F. Wil-
liams two days after the hearing. In it, he chronicles a meeting he had with L.K.W.
on the day after the hearing:
On October 17, 1984, this writer interviewed [L.K.W.] at this writer's
office. [L.K.W.] expresses a total and complete desire to reside with her
father and have nothing to do with her mother. Obviously, this writer does
not agree with this particular plan. After a long interview and conversation
with [L.K.W.], some matters have come to head [sic] in regards to the rela-
tionship with her mother. [L.K.W.] is very upset about the relationship be-
tween her mother and father and like most children, is upset due to the
divorce. [L.K.W.] is very upset with her mother due to their previous almost
sibling like rivalry and the drastic change that has taken place and secondly
is quite upset that her mother now is dating a 23 year old man from the
Manannah area, one that [L.K.W.] sees as nearly being her peer. This too,
one can see as a definite stressor in her life. I do not see an active relation-
ship between [L.K.W.] and her mother and personally believe that the entire
situation will have to be recultured and a new relationship brought about
between mother and daughter. I do not see this happening immediately and
personally believe it will take many months, if not years for it to come about
again. At the present time, considering the relationship between mother and
father, I do not see [L.K.W.] as being a good candidate for living totally with
her father. Obviously, Mr. [W.] is very upset with his situation and with his
wife and probably many of his actions and favors relayed towards [L.K.W.]
are nothing more than attempts to lash out at his spouse. I do not see any
malicious acts taking place towards [L.K.W.], but do not feel that it's a
healthy situation for her to be living with her father at the present time given
the pressures at hand.
Brief for Respondent at R.A. 13.
(Vol. 13
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testified that she wanted to live with her father.62
The trial court amended its August disposition order on October
26, 1984, ending the foster care placement but reinstating the re-
quirement that L.K.W. live with her mother seven out of every four-
teen days.63 Again, as on the previous two occasions, the disposition
order contained no findings of fact.64
In April 1985, the court held an additional review hearing.65 It
lasted ten minutes.66 It was reported that L.K.W. had stopped
spending fifty percent of her time with her mother in mid-February.
The probation officer first learned about this from the mother in
early April. 67 The officer had left two telephone messages for
L.K.W. since then, one with her father and one with her mother, but
she did not return his calls. 6 8 He further testified that she had com-
mitted no offenses and had no school problems.69 L.K.W. testified
that things were going well.7o Her father testified that she had fol-
lowed the probation rules. 71
The probation officer recommended placing L.K.W. at the St.
Croix Camp for Girls and the court so ordered.72 Its fourth and final
62. L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d at 396. She said, "I just can't understand.... I have
lived there all my life, it's my home and they won't let me live there." Id. (ellipsis in
original).
63. Id.; see also Brief for Respondent at R.A. 15-17 (juvenile court findings and
order).
64. LK.W., 372 N.W.2d at 396.
65. Id. The hearing was on April 16, 1985. Brief for Respondent at 32-34. The
court erroaeously reported that the hearing had been held on April 19. LK W., 372
N.W.2d at 396. The order may be found at Brief for Respondent at R.A. 32-34.
66. L.KW., 372 N.W.2d at 396.
67. Id.
68. Id. In his memo to Judge Williams on the day of the last hearing, the proba-
tion officer accused L.K.W. of having a "rather cavalier attitude", apparently because
his telephone messages were not returned. Id. n.6.
69. Id. at 396.
70. Id. The appellate court opinion quotes from the transcript: The child re-
ported that things were going well. She testified: "I guess it just works out better if I
don't see much of mom, because then we can get along better, and we don't fight."
Asked about a placement, she said she didn't want to go. Id.
71. Id.
72. The probation officer set out his recommendation to the judge in his memo
of April 19, 1985:
A specific recommendation for this case would be a self-terminating
program such as St. Croix Camp. I believe that control is necessary; the
program is self-terminating, it would be an excellent mechanism for her to
learn limits; and self esteem could be elevated. I believe dad is the main
motivator in this situation and he could pay a portion of the costs of the stay.
Brief for Respondent at R.A. 20. At the hearing, he testified:
I guess I don't see [the child] as being the type of probation case that
one could effectively work with. It isn't the fact that she's, uh, out violating
the law, it's the fact that, as I see it, [the child] doesn't have an understand-
ing of the fact that there are rules, things that have to go on in her life that
1987]
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disposition provided for the placement.73 The court found that
L.K.W. had violated a court order, and that its prior dispositon was
not working and was not likely to work in the future.74 Explaining
the ninety day placement to L.K.W., the court said:
You had your choice before. Now you don't have a choice any
more. Everybody's been giving you a chance all the way along, and
you don't seem to want to follow the rules. The rules are set down
for reasons, and discipline is one of the big reasons here.
Now you seem to think that you dictate the discipline, and that isn't
true. Uh, in this particular case, the discipline is set down by the
Court and your parents, and you have to abide by it. And you ha-
ven't done it. And that's the reason Mr. Johnson says that he can
no longer be of any help to you. You're not gonna follow, you
won't follow his rules, the rules set down. Up there they'll teach
you discipline. 75
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the disposition order
and dismissed the case against L.K.W. on the grounds that there
were inadequate supporting findings and that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support an institutional placement.76 It held that:
(1) the juvenile court must use the least drastic disposition neces-
sary for the rehabilitation of the child;77
(2) the disposition order must state why the best interests of the
child are served by the disposition ordered;7 8 and
(3) the findings must address the alternative dispositions consid-
ered by the court and state why such dispositions were not appropri-
ate in the instant case. 79
she has to follow. As I see the situation, she believes that she can do as she
sees fit, how she sees fit, and everything is fine. L.K. W., 372 N.W.2d at 397.
73. See Brief for Respondent at R.A. 32-34.
74. Id. at R.A. 28 (from hearing transcript); see also L.K. W., 372 N.W.2d at 397.
75. L.K.W, 372 N.W.2d at 397.
76. Id. at 403. The court stated:
The evidence is insufficient to show a need for any disposition in April
1985. In fact, it is difficult to find support from the evidence for any disposi-
tion in this case other than the continuation and supervision proposed ini-
tially in a complete and soundly-reasoned report of the child's first
probation officer; the integrity of that report is enhanced by the entire sub-
sequent history of the case. The choice of a correctional placement in April
1985 was arbitrary, neither necessary, fair, or just.
Id.
77. See id. at 397-98. The court found, "It is reversible error, both arbitrary and
unjust, to impose a disposition without evidence that it is necessary for the declared
statutory purpose of restoring law-abiding conduct." Id. (citations omitted).
78. See id. at 399-400.
79. Id. at 400-01. The opinion states:
Dispositional findings are mandated by the legislature and the supreme
court. Minn. Stat. § 260.185, subd. 1; Minn. R.P. Juv. Ct. 30.05. These
must address the dispositional choices "considered by the court" and rea-
[Vol. 13
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Legal standards are the subject of the appellate court opinion.80
Specifically, the court is concerned with the standards which compel
the juvenile court to use restraint when considering an institutional
placement.8 ' The opinion defends the standard of restraint, stating
that (1) it lends integrity to the court's role as guardian of the child's
welfare;8 2 and (2) it "does not conflict with notions of individualized
justice" as it requires that nothing be done which is not necessary for
the individual.8 3
The goal of a delinquency disposition is to restore in the child a
capacity for lawfulness.84 The disposition chosen by the court must
be "necessary" to accomplish that rehabilitation.8 5 The trial court
must balance two factors to determine whether intervention is neces-
sary: (1) the severity of the child's offense; and (2) the severity of the
proposed remedy.86 The least drastic necessary step must be
chosen.8
7
sons "why" one is preferred. Section 260.185, subd. 1. They must address
the interests and the needs of the child.
Id. at 400.
80. Id. at 402. The opinion specifically states that the issue in L.K W. "is not a
creature of modem due process law," nor is it "the topic of modern juvenile justice
debates." Id. at 401-02.
81. See id. at 401-02. The court states:
In one sense, the law of the case is uncomplicated. The juvenile court
act demands restraint of juvenile justice personnel. More particularly, the
statutes compel control over the choice to remove children from their own
home, a determination to avoid unnecessary or harmful placements.
Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 402.
83. Id. The concept of individualized justice "involves a primary demand that
nothing be done which is not necessary and suitable for the individual." Id.
84. Id. at 398.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court stated, "When the severity of intervention is disproportionate
to the severity of the problem, the intervention is not necessary and cannot lawfully
occur." Id.
87. Id. Compare id. with State v. Myers, 74 N.D. 297, 302, 22 N.W.2d 199, 201
(1946)(holding "the good of the State requires a child to be removed from a commu-
nity only when his delinquency is such that he has become a danger to society either
because of his own conduct or his influence upon others."). Myers is rare because,
like L.K. W, its subject matter is delinquency dispositions. The least drastic step phi-
losophy is also found in Myers:
We realize that proper disposition of cases of juvenile delinquency re-
quires a delicate balancing of mixed considerations and that even the most
careful weighing of pertinent factors can only result in conclusions that are
speculative to the extent that they attempt to predict the course of future
events. Confidence that a correct conclusion has been reached must of ne-
cessity rest upon hope founded in experience, rather than on certainty. We
think therefore that the problem should be approached in a spirit of opti-
mism and that drastic remedies should not be invoked where we can have
reasonable hope that lesser ones will have an equal if not a complete
success.
Id. National standards recently promulgated by the National Advisory Committee for
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The appellate court applied the "necessary" standard to the evi-
dence in L.K. W and found that the severe corrections disposition
was unwarranted.88 The punishment she received was clearly dis-
proportionate to her offense.89
Next, the court discussed the "best interests" standard.90 The Ju-
venile Court Act requires that a delinquency disposition serve the
child's best interests.91 Two requirements are added where place-
ment is considered to ensure that the child's best interests are being
met. First, there must be evidence that the child cannot be rehabili-
tated without being taken out of the home.92 And, second, there
must be evidence that the child's needs will be met by the place-
ment. 93 The court found that L.K.W. "had meaningful ties in a fam-
ily home," 94 and the evidence failed to show how placing her at the
St. Croix Camp would serve her needs or best interests.95 It con-
cluded, "Just as there was error here in the imposition of an unnec-
essary disposition, there was error in taking action which did not
serve the best interests of the child."96
The court notes that while judicial consideration of the issue of
legal standards for juvenile court dispositions is new, it has been dis-
cussed by psychologists and others for more than half a century. 97
The opinion in L.K. W was directed at trial court judges, to interpret
the language of the statutes and clarify or set the standards so the
judges will have a guide in their decision-making process.9 8
juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention also recommend that the court choose
the least restrictive sanction. L.K.W, 372 N.W.2d at 398 n.7.
88. L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d at 398-99.








97. See id. at 401.
98. In an interview on September 15, 1986, the Honorable Gary L. Crippen
mentioned several goals that he, as the writer of the L.K.W opinion, had Judge Crip-
pen made it clear, however, that the opinion was issued by the court of appeals and
the decision was formulated by a panel of the court. One of the goals in issuing the
opinion was to attempt to stimulate community interest in this type of case; although
speaking to the community was not a goal peculiar to L.K.W, as appellate judges
normally view the general public as one of the audiences for an appellate opinion.
He wanted the L.K. W case to be reviewed as thoroughly and carefully as cases on
other kinds of litigation. The Judge further mentioned that he feels that the creation
of the court of appeals has contributed significantly to an enhanced respect for the
seriousness of family and juvenile law. It was purposefully decided that the appellate
court would have jurisdiction over many areas, and each of those areas would be
treated equally. Crippen Interview, supra note 6.
[Vol. 13
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Out-of-home placement for juveniles who have committed serious
or minor offenses99 is on the rise in Minnesota.100 Thousands of
children are placed in various types of institutions and foster homes
every year.10t While the cost to taxpayers is tremendous,102 perhaps
99. Juvenile court does not distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors. If a
child breaks any federal, state or local law, and it is not a status offense, the child is
"delinquent" and is subject to the delinquency dispositions which include incarcera-
tion. The juvenile justice reforms of the 1970's included as a priority the "deinstitu-
tionalization" of status offenses. As a result, the status offenses were put into a
separate category, apart from the delinquency offenses. The reforms did not go far
enough, however, because the legislation failed to "hone down" the powers of the
court. The evidence of broad disposition powers for status offenses is found primar-
ily in Minnesota Statutes section 260.194 (1984). See also section 260.195. L.K. W.
illustrates the common dispositional powers for felonies and misdemeanors under
section 260.185, and reforms of the 1970's failed to deal with this issue. Incidentally,
L.K. W also illustrates the absence of any reform on the prospective duration of any
court jurisdiction (delinquency, status offenses, neglect or dependency) under Min-
nesota Statutes section 260.181, subdivision 4. Crippen Interview, supra note 6.
100. The most common offense on delinquency petitions in Minnesota in 1983
was larceny; the second most common was for "obstructing court" (an offense which
includes perjury, contempt of court, obstructing justice, obstructing a court order,
parole or probation violation, conditional release violation, and failure to appear in
court). See DIRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 10.
The most common reason for juvenile placement in a correctional facility is for
"obstructing court": "From 1982 to 1983, the numbers of juvenile cases for 'ob-
structing court' increased by 40%, causing an increase in correctional placements for
these cases by 130 juveniles - a 47% increase." Id. at 13.
L.K.W. was charged with obstructing court. The appellate court argued that
these review situations demand even stricter respect for standards:
Where a review deals with the child's response to prior demands, an
unusually strict respect for disposition standards is normally in order.
The United States Supreme Court has "long recognized the potential
for abuse" when one may be punished for acting with contempt toward a
court order .... The situation here was no different than a contempt case;
the court dealt with the case with almost singular focus on the integrity of its
prior demand for time the child was to spend with her mother.
Any new extension ofjudicial action is apt to enlarge the severity of the
original disposition. This is additional cause for careful use of standards
when reviewing a delinquency disposition.
L.KW., 372 N.W.2d at 402 (citations omitted).
101. A study done by the House of Representatives in early 1983 found that, in
1981,
nearly 16,000 children were placed out of their homes in various types of
residential institutions . . . at an estimated cost of $186 million. An addi-
tional 8,270 children were placed in foster care. The total of over 24,000
children in placement is approximately two and one-half percent of the
state's entire juvenile population.
Plant, Minnesota at the Crossroads: A Question ofJustice for Children, 1 JUSTICE FOR CHIL-
DREN 12, 12 (1986). The 1981 study was updated and the new data was released in
February 1986:
It showed total residential placements (both court-ordered and voluntary)
had increased 27 percent, while less restrictive foster care placements had
decreased 26 percent. The total number of children in placement in 1984
had risen to 27,261 from the 1981 level of 24,891.
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even more alarming is the price the child must pay in terms of loss of
liberty. 03
In 1984, the state legislature established a task force to examine
Minnesota's juvenile justice and child welfare system.104 Their pro-
posal is now before the legislature.105 It includes a comprehensive
revision or recodification of the Juvenile Code.106 Their goal is to
Id. at 13.
102. The cost of placement also was calculated in the 1986 House Family Law
Subcommittee Report:
And the cost for these placements went from $200.3 million in 1981, to
$291.7 million in 1984-an increase of 46 percent! The number of children
ordered into some form of residential placement by the juvenile court in-
creased from 6,817 to 9,040 during the period, an increase of 32.7 percent
at a time the juvenile population was declining.
Plant, supra note 101, at 13.
103. Juveniles have some constitutional guarantees when placement (or confine-
ment) is a possible outcome. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 34, 36-37, 49, 56-57. The Gault
court stated, "Commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against
one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil' "Id. at 50. Another recent appellate
court opinion from Minnesota, which dealt with the severity of dispositions for status
offenses, stated:
Likewise, there is not a legally significant distinction between commit-
ment to a training school and commitment to the myriad of corrections and
treatment facilities where chidren can be placed under Minn. Stat.
§ 260.194, subd. 1(c) (1984). [footnote omitted]. The child may be isolated
from home and community in these institutions, the child's life is controlled
by residential caretakers while in placement, and complete isolation and
confinement can occur in many of the facilities. Additionally, public secure
detention facilities may be employed to confine children who do not con-
form to the demands of residential caretakers. An institution of confine-
ment is still an institution of confinement, "however euphemistic the title."
Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
L.Z., 380 N.W.2d at 905.
The child's constitutional rights are set out at MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 21.03, subd. 1:
Before accepting an admission by the child the court shall determine under
the totality of the circumstances whether the child understands all applica-
ble rights. The court shall on the record, or by written document signed by
the child and child's counsel, if any, filed with the court, determine the fol-
lowing:
(a) whether the child understands:
(i) the nature of the offense alleged, and
(ii) the right to a trial, and
(iii) the presumption of innocence until the state proves the alle-
gations beyond a reasonable doubt, and
(iv) the right to remain silent, and
(v) the right to testify on the child's own behalf, and
(vi) the right to confront witnesses against oneself, and
(vii) the right to subpoena witnesses.
MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 21.03, subd. 1.
104. See Plant, supra note 101, at 12 (stating that the Task Force completed its
work in January 1985).
105. Id. The proposal is co-sponsored by Sen. Michael Freeman (Dem.) and Rep.
Arthur Seaberg (IR).
106. Id. These principles form the basis of the revision of the juvenile code:
1. Many current jurisdictional standards are either vague or overly broad.
[Vol. 13
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develop a "framework for appropriate and proportional responses to
the behavior and needs of the state's children."10 7
L.K. W. chronicles a juvenile court's harsh and unjust treatment of
a child who committed a single minor offense.108 Thirty-five years
ago, a psychiatrist noted, "few fields exist in which more serious co-
ercive measures are applied, on such flimsy objective evidence, than
in that ofjuvenile delinquency."109 The court of appeals, in L.K W.,
set boundaries to limit the "unbridled discretion" of the trial court in
juvenile delinquency matters. While reform of the juvenile justice
system may necessarily be perpetual as society and its notions about
children and how they should be treated change, L.K. W. demon-
The law should provide clear notice as to specific behaviors or conditions
which may result in coercive intervention by government.
2. The present law and system lack procedural clarity and uniformity, as
well as standards and criteria for decision making, especially with respect to
out-of-home and voluntary placements. The law should define clearly the
roles and responsibilities of all participants and detail procedures which will
permit affected parties to participate in fact finding and decision making.
3. There is a wide disparity in the provision of meaningful due process.
The law must specifically detail each parties' rights and assure through sys-
tem accountability that individual discretion, local practice or administrative
convenience does not result in denials of due process.
Id.
The Honorable Gary L. Crippen was a member of the Task Force. In a recent
interview, the Judge said that, in retrospect, there are some things he wishes the Task
Force had done differently. First, he said that they should not have attempted to
totally re-do the Code. Second, the Task Force should have limited the number of
recommendations it made to seven or eight, not fifty-five.
Judge Crippen had six specific areas of possible reform that he believes are ob-
tainable. First, specific jurisdictional limits ought to be put on dispositions in cases
involving minor offenses, and the limits ought to be written into the Code. Second,
the legislature and county boards must become familiar with the fact that "privatiza-
tion" often involves a complete, uncontrolled delegation of responsibility to formu-
late and enforce public policy standards in providing services for children. Third,
more could be done to educate the public and the people involved in the juvenile
court system. Fourth, children need to have competent counsel with them when they
appear in court. More attention should be paid to discouraging waiver of this impor-
tant right. Fifth, we should reconsider having the juvenile court be a specialized
court. It may be that it needs to be more a part of the mainstream. Sixth, we need to
improve court services. We need to develop and maintain a solid core of caring serv-
ices. As it stands, probation officers and social workers are often asked at the same
time to perform a quasi-policing or quasi-judicial role (for example, they must formu-
late recommendations for judicial action, formulate lists of mandatory corrective
steps, detect violations of conditions of probationary supervision or protective super-
vision, and arrest violators). We need people whose only job is to care about the
child. Crippen Interview, supra note 6.
107. See Plant, supra note 101, at 13.
108. The court stated in closing, "The three month confinement of L.K.W. 150
miles from her home, summarily ordered, for no lawful cause, was singularly harsh
and unjust." L.K.W, 372 N.W.2d at 402.
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strates that, in Minnesota, the issue of placement in delinquency dis-
positions has at least been addressed.
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